We thank Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) for their interest in our paper and for their comments that witness the growing attention to the neurology of moral behaviour. Although, as they suggest, we could have discussed the potential cerebellar role in morality, our review aimed to outline only the major research findings and we deliberately included proved experimental and clinical data (Fumagalli and Priori, 2012) . For this reason we were unable to mention the studies referenced by Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) . Equally important, none of these studies or the previous reviews in this field (Cooper et al., 1976; Heath, 1977; Moll et al., 2005; Raine and Yang, 2006; Young and Koenigs, 2007; Eslinger et al., 2009; Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009; Harada et al., 2009; Huebner et al., 2009; Moll and Schulkin, 2009; Demirtas-Tatlidede et al., 2010; Harenski et al., 2010; Shenhav and Greene, 2010) specifically discuss the cerebellum as a major brain structure for moral behaviour. Also, to explain the cerebellar role in morality and violence DemirtasTatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) proposed the 'dysmetria of thought theory'. Although interesting, the scarce data available imposes caution in concluding that the cerebellum acts as a specific and determinant 'moral regulator'.
Sir,
We thank Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) for their interest in our paper and for their comments that witness the growing attention to the neurology of moral behaviour. Although, as they suggest, we could have discussed the potential cerebellar role in morality, our review aimed to outline only the major research findings and we deliberately included proved experimental and clinical data (Fumagalli and Priori, 2012) . For this reason we were unable to mention the studies referenced by Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) . Equally important, none of these studies or the previous reviews in this field (Cooper et al., 1976; Heath, 1977; Moll et al., 2005; Raine and Yang, 2006; Young and Koenigs, 2007; Eslinger et al., 2009; Funk and Gazzaniga, 2009; Harada et al., 2009; Huebner et al., 2009; Moll and Schulkin, 2009; Demirtas-Tatlidede et al., 2010; Harenski et al., 2010; Shenhav and Greene, 2010) specifically discuss the cerebellum as a major brain structure for moral behaviour. Also, to explain the cerebellar role in morality and violence DemirtasTatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) proposed the 'dysmetria of thought theory'. Although interesting, the scarce data available imposes caution in concluding that the cerebellum acts as a specific and determinant 'moral regulator'.
For several years our research group has been conducting research work on the human cerebellum's cognitive/affective role (Ferrucci et al., 2008 (Ferrucci et al., , 2012 (Ferrucci et al., , 2013 and we are well aware of non-motor cerebellar functions. We conjecture that the cerebellum might indirectly and non-specifically influence moral behaviour, by exerting control on high-order cognitive and affective processes. This influence could travel through cerebellar connections directed to cortical and subcortical structures found to be involved in morality and in other high-order cognitive and behavioural processes for which the cerebellum now appears to be a general regulator. For instance, our finding that cerebellar stimulation influences the recognition of negative emotions such as anger (Ferrucci et al., 2012) could provide another clue to the multifaceted puzzle involving the physiology of aggressive behaviour and, ultimately, of moral behaviour.
Finally, in the last paragraph in their letter, referring to the 'ethics of stimulation', Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) underline the ethical caveats that apply especially to the possible future use of brain stimulation techniques for shaping morality. We fully agree that even though immoral behaviours violate ethical rules we must guard against proposing treatment that could violate them until we have developed impeccable guidelines; we concluded our review by stating 'understanding the dysfunctional brain structures underlying abnormal moral behaviour can lead to specific treatments nowadays using deep brain stimulation or other new non-invasive neuromodulation techniques. For instance, apart from treating aggression, deep brain stimulation might be used in other forms of pathological antisocial behaviour or violence (including sexual assaulters and paedophiles) when education and rehabilitation programmes or other treatments fail. Among future concerns about the hypothetical use of brain stimulation techniques in this field, the possibility of shaping individual morality raises intriguing ethical issues that should prompt the development of treatment guide-Meanwhile, as Demirtas-Tatlidede and Schmahmann (2013) rightly note, the neurological basis of morality, wherever it lies in the brain, will continue to offer exciting opportunities for research.
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